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CONSIDERATIONS FOR KOREA AND THE 
TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP
By Troy Stangarone
 
Abstract
The Trans-Pacific Partnership is designed to create what is often referred to as a 21st century trade agreement and serve as a 
potential stepping stone to a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific. As Korea begins consultations on joining the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, domestic and international trends are likely to weigh high on Korea’s agenda. With economic growth slowing 
and Korea facing long-term structural challenges such as an aging population, President Park Geun-hye is seeking to increase 
innovation and spur job creation through the development of a creative economy. At the same time, Korea faces a changing 
international economic environment as international trade agreements shift from bilateral FTAs to larger regional trade 
agreements. This shift has the potential to provide Korea with a larger platform for the development of a creative economy; 
while Korea’s extensive FTA network also places it in a position to serve as a linchpin to connect both the East Asian and the 
Asia-Pacific efforts to spur regional economic integration. As Korea consults with its potential partners, issues such as the future 
shape of regional rules and standards, the prospective economic benefits of increased regional trade, the potential to aid the shift 
to a creative economy, and the costs of joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership, along with foreign policy considerations, will likely 
play a significant role in Korea’s final decision. 
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In East Asia, trade liberalization and regional economic 
integration are taking place along two tracks. The first track 
is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) that encompasses 
nations on both sides of the Pacific Ocean. The second, and 
more recent track, is an Asian track that centers on ASEAN 
and includes Korea, China, Japan, New Zealand, Australia, 
and India known as the Regional Economic Cooperative 
Partnership (RCEP). 
While Korea has a free trade agreement (FTA) with the 
United States, upon which much of the TPP is expected 
to be based, and is in the process of negotiating bilateral 
FTAs with many of the current TPP participants, including 
Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, it had not previously 
expressed strong interest in joining the TPP prior to its 
announcement on November 29, 2013 that it would seek to 
begin the consultation process to join. However, a continued 
lack of participation could have significant implications for 
Korea despite its current participation in RCEP. The trading 
environment has evolved as states move towards larger, more 
regionally focused agreements. Of the two agreements, TPP 
is at a significantly more advanced stage and the most likely 
of the two agreements to impact the behind the boarder issues 
that have become the greatest obstacles to trade as tariffs have 
been cut over the years. If Korea chooses not to pursue TPP, it 
would face the prospect of finding itself in a similar situation 
to European states that are not part of the European Union 
– subject to rules and disciplines set by others but with little 
influence over the decisions. 
This, however, is not consistent with Korea’s broader free 
trade policy. Over the last decade, Korea has had one of the 
more substantial trade liberalization policies of any state 
in East Asia which was designed to both open markets for 
Korean exports and to introduce needed domestic reforms 
into the economy. In this tradition, the Park administration 
has expressed a desire for Korea to serve as a linchpin 
between the RCEP and the TPP. If Korea is able to serve as a 
common point between the two agreements, it could help to 
shape a broader agreement covering both East Asia and the 
Pacific states of the Americas. Serving as a linchpin for such 
an agreement, however, requires Korea’s participation and 
influence in both camps. 
Beyond the trade considerations, TPP has implications for 
Korea’s domestic economic reforms. With provisions on 
intellectual property and the services sector, TPP could 
enhance Korea’s ability to export new products from an 
increasingly innovative economy. With greater market access 
for intellectual property abroad, the TPP would expand the 
potential market for innovative Korean products and help to 
lay the groundwork for the environment necessary for the 
creative economy the Park Geun-hye administration hopes to 
develop to address Korea’s long-term economic challenges. 
The Challenges Ahead for the  
Korean Economy
Despite having weathered the global financial crisis better 
than most OECD countries, the Korean economy faces a 
series of challenges in the years ahead. When the crisis hit 
in the fall of 2008, Korea was much better positioned to 
weather the storm than it was in 1997. Government debt was 
just below 30 percent of GDP, providing the fiscal space to 
implement one of the largest stimulus packages as a percent 
of GDP of any nation. At the height of the crisis in 2009, 
the economy grew, if only at an anemic 0.3 percent, and 
bounced back to grow at 6.3 percent in 2010 before tailing 
off more recently.
But if external shocks dominated the last two decades, the 
challenges that lay ahead may turn out to be domestic in nature. 
Despite the success of Samsung, Hyundai, and other Korean 
companies, the manufacturing heavy export model that has 
driven Korea’s development will increasingly come under 
pressure from low cost producers in China and other emerging 
markets. While Korea currently maintains a large trade surplus 
with China that may change in the years ahead as Chinese firms 
rapidly catch up to Korean firms. This shift can already be 
seen in industries such as shipbuilding where Korea was once 
dominant. While Korea is still number one producer in terms of 
the total value of orders, China has surpassed Korea in terms of 
the total tonnage of orders. China may make more ships than 
Korea, but Korea’s ships are more advanced.
At the same time that Korea faces an increasingly competitive 
external environment, its population is beginning to age and 
personal debt is reaching all time highs. Much like Japan, 
Korea has one of the world’s lowest birthrates and the working 
age population is expected to begin declining during the term 
of the current administration.
Despite Korea’s economic success it only recently put in 
place social welfare programs to support the elderly, one of 
two who lives in poverty according to the OECD. As Korea’s 
population ages it may lose some of the budget flexibility that 
it maintained in the 2008 crisis to social welfare. One of Park 
Geun-hye’s campaign pledges was to provide coverage to all 
retirees. The government has already enacted some reforms 
to the old age pensions and we should expect the costs to rise 
in the years ahead.
Efforts to shift Korea’s economy towards greater domestic 
consumption are hindered by growing levels of household debt 
constraining increases in consumer consumption. Since 2003, 
household debt has risen from 72.9 percent of Korea’s nominal 
GDP to 91.1 percent in 2012, while also rising from 126.5 
percent to 163.8 percent as a share of disposable income during 
the same period. 
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To address these and other structural issues in the Korean 
economy, Park Geun-hye has proposed the development of 
a “creative economy” that spurs job creation and catalyzes a 
paradigm shift from an economy based in exports to one that 
fosters innovation. Park’s proposal has placed an emphasis 
on the convergence of IT and software technologies, 
scientific research, and integrating technology with cultural 
content. All are areas where Korea is perceived to have a 
competitive advantage.
Increasing competitiveness, creating jobs, and encouraging 
innovation means bridging the productivity gap between 
the services sector and the chaebol. While the chaebol are 
highly competitive internationally, many of the small and 
medium sized businesses that make up Korea’s services 
sector, which the OECD rates as one of the least efficient in 
the developed world, are inefficient but also the main source 
of jobs in Korea. In 2011, the ten largest chaebol accounted 
for nearly 80 percent of the economy, but less than 5 percent 
of employment. For this reason, the creative economy 
initiative is focused on improving productivity among SMEs 
and providing a competitive framework that will encourage 
entrepreneurship and innovation among Korea’s SMEs.
Korea’s Trade Policy
Modern Korean trade policy begins in the aftermath of the 
Asian financial crisis when a shift from multilateral to 
bilateral trade agreements began. For much of its export 
driven development, Korea depended on multilateral trade 
negotiations, first through the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) and later the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), to open markets for the exports that drove its 
economic growth and development. For Korea, the crisis 
exposed imbalances within the economy and the need to 
undertake structural reform, some of which were mandated by 
the IMF as part of Korea’s rescue package during the crisis. 
At the same time, broader shifts were taking place in the 
global trading system. The GATT/WTO process was coming 
under strain. Efforts to launch the current Doha round during 
the Seattle WTO meetings were unsuccessful and the round 
itself almost ground to a halt during the Cancun ministerial 
in 2003. Once the Doha round talks were up and running, 
they were primarily centered on addressing the needs of 
developing nations and eventually became deadlocked over 
issues related to agriculture. 
Like many nations, agriculture was a sensitive issue for Korea 
despite its need to import a significant amount of food to feed 
its population. As with many Asian nations, rice is a highly 
sensitive commodity, and one of the obstacles to the eventual 
U.S.-Korea FTA (KORUS FTA) was a ban on U.S. beef in the 
aftermath of the discovery of BSE in the United States. 
Beyond Korea’s own sensitivities and the Doha round’s 
focus on agriculture, the global talks were never able to 
address in any meaningful fashion the broader market access 
issues that would be necessary for an export driven economy 
such as Korea’s to benefit substantially from the round.1 
Meanwhile, there had been a growing proliferation of 
regional and bilateral FTAs that threatened to erode Korea’s 
competitive advantage and potentially spur trade diversion 
at Korea’s expense. 
In response to these changes, Korea’s trade policy underwent 
a series of changes in the late 1990s and 2000s. Facing the 
prospect of trade diversion from the growing number of 
FTAs, Korea began exploring the possibility of engaging in 
its own bilateral FTAs under the Kim Dae-jung administration 
and launched its first FTA talks with Chile in 1999. 
Until the conclusion of Korea’s FTA with Chile in 2003, it 
was one of two countries in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) that had not concluded an FTA with another country 
despite its heavy dependence on international trade. Even 
today, exports and imports each represent more than 50 
percent of Korea’s GDP. In contrast, the United States which 
is significantly less dependent upon trade concluded its first 
FTA with Israel in 1984 and the North American Free Trade 
Agreement in the early 1990s, more than a decade before 
Korea’s agreement with Chile.
Kim Dae-jung’s successor, Roh Moo-hyun, would lay 
out Korea’s first FTA Promotion Roadmap. Under the 
roadmap, Korea divided its potential FTA partners into two 
classifications. The first set included regional partners such as 
Singapore, ASEAN, and Japan that Korea would seek FTAs 
with in the short term, while Korea would seek FTAs with 
major economies such as the United States and the European 
Union in the medium-to-long term.2 
However, midway through the Roh administration, the 
emphasis changed. Korea’s talks with Japan became stalled3 
over Japan’s reluctance to liberalize its agricultural sector and 
the decision was made to move up Korea’s plans to negotiate 
FTAs with the major economies. Negotiations with the United 
States began in 2006 and shortly after talks were concluded 
on the KORUS FTA, Korea began negotiations with the 
European Union. The emphasis in Korea’s trade policy also 
shifted from mostly regional, small economies to a pursuit of 
agreements with partners around the globe. 
By the beginning of the Lee Myung-bak administration, 
Korea’s trade policy could be described as follows: (1) 
focused on reaching agreements with advanced economies 
and promising emerging markets; (2) pursuing high level, 
comprehensive agreements that contain a significant degree 
of liberalization and wide-ranging in terms of the areas 
covered; (3) a multi-track negotiating process; and (4) 
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greater outreach to the public and private sector to build a 
national consensus. 
Trade policy also became a means to facilitate needed structural 
reforms. Despite Korea’s success as a manufacturing exporter, 
the services sector is one of the least developed among OECD 
nations. The KORUS and EU FTAs were used as tools to 
liberalize services and inject international competition, 
something the Roh Moo-hyun administration was open about. 
In the case of the KORUS FTA, President Roh is said to have 
wryly noted that perhaps his negotiators did too good of a job 
on this count.
Despite being a latecomer to the drive for FTAs, Seoul has 
played a significant role in shaping the current environment 
in East Asia. After concluding the KORUS FTA, China 
signaled its desire to conclude an FTA with Korea, while 
Japan indicated that it would like to restart its negotiations 
with Korea. Though talks with Japan have continued to 
stall, negotiations with China are underway and the high 
standard of Korea’s FTAs has likely helped spur China to 
agree to a more comprehensive agreement than would have 
been the case otherwise. Additionally, the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) talks are largely modeled off of the 
KORUS FTA.
However, as the Park Geun-hye administration came into 
office in 2013, changes in the trading system and domestic 
needs necessitated a fresh look at Korea’s trade policy. 
Emerging economies such as India and China were playing 
an increasingly more important role in international trade, 
while plurilateral and regional agreements began to take on 
a more prominent role as well. Efforts were underway to 
launch a plurilateral services agreement, as well as to update 
the Information Technology Agreement. The United States 
was pursuing both the TPP and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP), while China was pushing 
RCEP as an alternative to the TPP.
The updated trade policy roadmap put forward by the 
Park administration seeks to address the new challenges 
Korea faces while better integrating Korea’s trade policy 
into its own shift towards a creative economy. Under the 
new policy Korea seeks to: (1) serve as a linchpin for 
regional economic integration; (2) be proactive towards 
the changing global trade order; (3) develop a trade model 
that is applicable to developed and developing countries; 
(4) promote policies that help to create jobs and greater 
integrate small and medium sized enterprises into trade 
agreements; (5) proactively take part in multilateral 
negotiations at the WTO; and (6) build the domestic 
political foundation for trade policies.
The Trans-Pacific Partnership and Consid-
erations for Korea
In Bogor, Indonesia in 1994, the member states of APEC 
agreed to work towards the goal of creating an area for free 
and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific in two stages. 
In the first, trade and investment would be liberalized among 
developed nations by 2010, while developing nations would 
join them by 2020. To help find a path to achieving that goal, 
the initial P4 members of New Zealand, Chile, Brunei, and 
Singapore sought to develop a path forward towards the Bogor 
goal. In doing so they established the framework for the current 
talks underway for the TPP which now also includes the United 
States, Canada, Mexico, Vietnam, Peru, Malaysia, Australia, 
and Japan. 
As constructed, the TPP is designed to create what is often 
referred to as a 21st century trade agreement. In basic terms, 
this means that the goal of the TPP is to establish an agreement 
where tariff and non-tariff barriers are removed. Practically 
speaking, there are likely to still be some exceptions, such as 
rice, from any final agreement. However, if successful, the TPP 
would represent an important milestone whose ambition and 
scope could help to develop new rules and disciplines for a wide 
range of issues regionally and in future multilateral discussions.
One unique feature of the TPP is that it is expected to be a living 
agreement. New members would be able to join in the future 
and members could address new issues as they evolve.
In terms of its impact, potential income gains from TPP for 
Korea are substantial. In some of the more sited work done 
by Peter Petri and Michael Plummer,4 Korea stands to see 
income gains from TPP of $45.8 billion. This rises to $50.2 
billion if the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand were to 
move forward on their interest and join. Should Korea decide 
to remain outside of the TPP, it is expected to see a small 
income loss of $2.8 billion. The expected gains from TPP, 
however, are smaller than the $82.0 billion Petri and Plummer 
expect that Korea would gain from participation in the RCEP 
or the $129.3 billion in income gains should a Free Trade Area 
of the Asia Pacific emerge.
However, as with any nation, the decision to join the TPP 
is not simply a matter of measuring the total income gains 
of each agreement and negotiating the one with the greatest 
income gain. The TPP is not merely a bilateral agreement, 
but a potential blueprint for the future shape of economic 
interaction across much of Asia and the Pacific. This means 
there are broader considerations such as Korea’s vision 
for economic integration in the region, its own domestic 
economic interests and how they related to the international 
economic structure, and foreign policy considerations to 
name a few. 
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Given that the TPP is an ongoing negotiation, it is unclear 
if time remains for Korea to join and participate in the 
formation of rules. However, USTR Michael Froman 
suggested that any new partners to TPP would likely join 
after the negotiations are concluded. With this in mind, the 
following sections will look at some of these considerations 
for Korea joining the TPP in context of their impact on Korea 
and areas where it may have in interest in contributing to the 
development of rules in more detail.
Why Rules Matter
Much of the debate over Korea’s participation in the TPP has 
centered on the larger expected income gains from Korea’s 
participation in RCEP. While understandable, as the income 
benefits of an agreement matter, they are not the whole picture. 
Korea began engaging in bilateral trade agreements due to 
a concern that they would erode the benefits it gained from 
multilateral trade agreements. As tariffs become less of a barrier 
to the movement of goods than behind the boarder issues, 
the rules and the structure of the system take on increased 
significance. Of the two regional agreements, TPP is the most 
ambitious in terms of its coverage and its scope.
While the KORUS FTA is serving as a baseline for the TPP 
talks, the TPP is also expected to go beyond the provisions 
in the KORUS FTA. The TPP is expected to include new 
disciplines on state owned enterprises, labor, the environment, 
and competition policy, while also addressing cross-cutting 
issues such as development policies, the participation of SMEs 
in regional trade and investment, and regulatory coherence. 
While some of these provisions may ultimately be reflective 
of Korea’s commitments under the KORUS FTA, their final 
shape may require some adjustment on Korea’s part in areas 
such as regulatory coherence. However, for other issues, such 
as SME participation, Korea joining after TPP’s conclusion 
may have minimal impact. To date, negotiators have focused 
on capacity building issues. This is an area where Korea could 
easily adopt any new measures unilaterally, most likely with 
minimal impact even if it decided not to move forward with the 
TPP after its initial consultations. 
From the perspective of rules, there are three reasons 
it may be in Korea’s interest to join the TPP in the first 
wave. First, while the KORUS FTA may be the current 
gold standard for an agreement, there are no assurances 
that TPP will not diverge from KORUS on some rules, 
especially on areas not covered by the KORUS FTA. For 
example, there is the issue of supply chains. If the final 
version of TPP included rules of origin or harmonized 
standards that help to facilitate trade through TPP members 
and make movement through Korea less appealing for 
regional supply chains, Korea may find itself in a situation 
analogous to non-EU member states in Europe. Not part of 
the larger agreement, but having to meet regional standards 
to remain competitive.
Second, joining the TPP would help to set a standard of rules 
across the region under which Korean companies could operate. 
Because Korea’s FTAs with partners other than the United 
States and the EU are not of the same scope and coverage, 
differing rules apply across agreements. The TPP would allow 
Korea to update those agreements and set common rules with 
new partners. While the chaebol have the capacity to deal with 
differing rules and tariff rates for differing agreements, TPP 
would help SMEs by providing them with one set of rules for 
whichever member state they wished to do business in.
Lastly, Korea’s decision on TPP will signal its vision for the 
shape that regional integration should take. If Korea joins the 
TPP it will signal to Korea’s other trade partners that Korea 
favors a high level of liberalization and the types of rules Korea 
hopes to see as regional integration moves forward. If Korea 
continues to demure over the long run, it may send a different 
signal and misconstrue Korea’s intentions.
Why is all of this important? As a recent report by the Korea 
Institute for International Economic Policy5 (KIEP) notes, 
tariffs in the United States and the EU on manufactured goods 
average 2.0 percent and 2.4 percent, respectively, while both 
are largely open economies. Despite this, both the United 
States and the EU are currently negotiating the TTIP. The 
KIEP report, however, goes on to note that in areas such as 
cosmetics, food and beverages, and automobiles the effect 
of the non-tariff barriers is 25.5-73.3 percent, while the costs 
from regulatory differences in general can reach the tariff 
equivalent of 10-20 percent.
However, the report also notes that in terms of global trade, “a 
U.S.-EU FTA can contribute to restructuring the global trading 
system around the U.S. and EU. For instance, if discussions 
on the FTA move ahead on a comprehensive level, covering 
trade in services, regulations, investment, intellectual property 
rights and government procurement markets, both sides can 
push the negotiations of results as global agendas, thus gaining 
a stronger foothold within a multilateral framework.” Given the 
similar size and scope of the TPP it can have a similar impact.
Invigorating the Creative Economy
The shift to a creative economy will require more than the 
creation of a domestic ecosystem that encourages investors and 
entrepreneurs to take risks and translate failure into success. 
It will require time, and cultural shifts that place risk taking 
above safe salaried jobs, things which no free trade agreement 
can provide. As Korea works to undertake this transition, trade 
policy can play a role in Korea’s continued economic evolution 
with the TPP helping to create a broader regional environment 
more conducive to innovation and helping to spread the cost of 
research and development over a larger market. 
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For the last six decades, Korea’s economy has in large part 
grown by learning to do the things others have already 
done better and cheaper. If Korea is instead to move to the 
production possibility frontier with other nations, such as 
the United States, innovation will take on a larger role in 
the economy. As it does, the value of production in Korea’s 
economy will come to be based increasingly upon intellectual 
property (IP) and a greater portion of the economy dedicated 
to the services sector. Korean firms will increasingly compete 
with international rivals not on cost, but on innovation. This 
is already occurring in some industries, as was previously 
mentioned in the shipping industry.
Strong IP protections also play a role in encouraging exports. 
In foreign markets they provide assurances to investors 
and businesses that they will reap the gains from the new 
products and services they develop from their creativity, 
by protecting against intellectual theft and providing the 
safeguards needed to promote exports and the dissemination 
of technology. Weaker IP protections in neighboring countries 
would undermine Korea’s potential competitive advantage 
as an innovative economy, while low wage countries would 
be able to utilize their cost advantages in combination with 
other countries IP. Having proper IP protections in place 
both domestically and internationally is important even with 
other advanced economies as the ongoing disputes between 
Samsung and Apple demonstrate. 
Additionally, the TPP could help to open the services markets 
of many of the TPP member states. Members such as Chile and 
Brunei score poorly on metrics such as the GATS Commitments 
Restrictiveness Index. As Korea has learned through its 
own development, restricting the services sector produces 
lower rates of innovation and economic growth. A stronger 
commitment to service sector openings in the TPP would 
benefit emerging Korean service providers, who will likely be 
leaders in the creative economy, by providing them with new 
export opportunities and unlike tariff benefits, the benefits of 
expanded services access are something that do not often show 
up in estimates of the economic benefits of an agreement.6
In the case of SMEs, which the Park government is hoping 
to promote to enhance job creation, many of the most 
promising markets and opportunities may be in the services 
sectors of other countries. The inclusion of a more conducive 
environment for creative industries in TPP would also create 
a larger “domestic” market for entrepreneurial Koreans to 
develop and build new businesses.
As Korea becomes a more innovative economy, IP, services, 
and the needs of SMEs will continue to grow in prominence in 
the new Korean economy. By joining TPP Korea can continue 
to push for regional rules and services access that will benefit 
the creative economy in the long run. 
The Cost of Entry7 
Now that Korea has expressed its interest in joining the TPP 
it will engage in a series of consultations with current TPP 
members. As part of the consultations, the existing members 
will seek commitments from Korea in regards to its ambition 
for the negotiations and potentially to resolve some existing 
trade irritants prior to Korea’s accession. Since Korea will 
likely be joining after TPP is concluded, members would be 
seeking Korea’s commitment to the full ambition of the TPP as 
it is negotiated.
This process is not dissimilar to Korea’s talks with the 
United States over the U.S.-Korea FTA or Japan’s and other 
countries’ accessions to the TPP. In the case of the U.S.-Korea 
FTA, the United States asked Korea to address issues related 
to Korea’s ban on U.S. beef and screen quota prior to entering 
into negotiations. Before Japan’s entrance into the TPP, it 
engaged in the same process, where it agreed to engage the 
United States in parallel discussions on barriers related to the 
automotive industry, for example.
In the case of Korea and TPP, current participants could also 
seek advance commitments from Korea prior to granting it 
membership. Korea currently has restrictions on U.S. beef 
over the age of 30 months as part of a commercial agreement 
with U.S. industry and still has bans on the importation of 
beef from Canada. Requests for the immediate removal of 
these restrictions, or other issues, could make the cost of entry 
unattractive to Korea.
Outward Processing Zones
In all of its FTAs, Korea has sought provisions to allow 
for the export of goods from outward processing zones to 
be included in its agreements and considered as Korean. 
This primarily means goods from the Kaesong Industrial 
Complex in North Korea, but in time could also include 
additional industrial complexes. While some TPP members 
currently have provisions on outward processing zones in 
their FTAs with Korea, not all TPP members do and not all 
of the provisions are comparable (see Table 1).
Despite the TPP being designed as a living agreement that 
would address new issues as they arose, the issue of outward 
processing zones might be the most difficult for Korea to 
raise in regards to TPP. While Korea should not seek to hold 
up the TPP talks over outward processing zones if it were to 
join the talks, there are clear steps it could take to ensure the 
issue is addressed. 
First, Korea could request the inclusion in TPP of a provision to 
allow it to individually negotiate terms with each member for 
the inclusion of outward processing zones on the condition that 
this ad hoc access could not be utilized for the transshipment 
of goods from Kaesong. It could also be understood that talks 
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Free Trade Agreement Key Provisions
KORUS FTA
•	Provides	for	the	establishment	of	a	committee	to	consider	the	inclusion	of	outward	processing	
zones	1	year	after	entry	into	force.
•	 The	committee’s	key	criteria	for	consideration	include:	progress	toward	the	denuclearization	of	
the	Korean	Peninsula;	the	impact	of	the	outward	processing	zones	on	intra-Korean	relations;	
and	the	environmental	standards,	labor	standards	and	practices,	wage	practices	and	business	
and	management	practices	prevailing	in	the	outward	processing	zone,	with	due	reference	to	the	
situation	prevailing	elsewhere	in	the	local	economy	and	the	relevant	international	norms.
•	 The	committee	shall	establish	a	maximum	threshold	for	the	total	value	of	the	originating	good	
which	may	be	added	in	the	outward	processing	zone.
European  
Union FTA
•	Provides	for	the	establishment	of	a	committee	to	consider	the	inclusion	of	outward		
processing	zones.
•	 The	committee	will	establish	what	criteria	must	be	met	and	will	determine	what	total	value	of	the	
final	good	may	be	added	in	the	outward	processing	zone.
European Free  
Trade Area FTA
•	Provides	for	an	exemption	from	the	principal	of	territoriality.
•	Goods	shall	be	determined	to	be	South	Korean	goods	if	(1)	the	total	value	added	does	not	
exceed	10	percent;	or	(2)	the	total	non-originating	input	does	not	exceed	40	percent	of	the	final	
price	claimed	and	the	total	value	of	the	originating	material	is	not	less	than	60	percent	of	the	
total	value	of	the	materials	used	in	the	re-imported	material	or	product.
•	Allows	for	revisions	to	the	exemption	from	the	principal	of	territoriality	after	3	years.
Singapore FTA
•	Provides	for	the	use	of	outward	processing	under	the	following	conditions:	(1)	the	value	of	the		
non-originating	inputs	do	not	exceed	40	percent	of	the	customs	value	of	the	final	good	as	
claimed;	(2)	the	value	of	the	originating	material	is	not	less	than	45	percent	of	the	final	customs	
value	claimed;	(3)	the	producer	of	the	exported	material	and	the	final	product	are	the	same;	and	
(4)		
the	last	process	of	production	takes	place	in	the	originating	country.
India FTA
•	Provides	for	an	exemption	from	the	principal	of	territoriality	related	to	the	Kaesong		
Industrial	Complex.
•	Provides	a	list	of	eligible	goods.
•	Goods	shall	be	determined	as	originating	in	South	Korea	if	the	total	value	of	the	North	Korean		
input	does	not	exceed	40	percent	and	the	value	of	the	South	Korean	content	is	not	less	than	60	
percent	of	the	value	of	materials	used	in	manufacturing	the	re-imported	material	or	good.
•	Provides	for	the	usage	of	safeguards	on	goods	exported	from	Kaesong	with	a	two	month	notice	
and	the	rescinding	of	the	exemption	from	the	principal	of	territoriality	after	5	years.			
ASEAN FTA
•	Provides	for	goods	from	either	party	to	be	considered	originating	from	the	party	if	processing	is	
taken	on	materials	exported	from	the	originating	party	and	re-exported	to	the	party.
•	Provides	for	the	list	of	eligible	products	and	procedures	to	be	determined	at	a	later	date.		
Turkey FTA
•	Provides	for	the	establishment	of	a	committee	to	consider	the	inclusion	of	outward		
processing	zones.
•	 The	committee	will	establish	what	criteria	must	be	met	and	will	determine	what	total	value	of	the	
final	good	may	be	added	in	the	outward	processing	zone.
Source:	South	Korea’s	FTAs	with	the	United	States,	the	European	Union,	the	European	Free	Trade	Association,	Singapore,	India,	Turkey		
and	ASEAN.
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on this issue need not be concluded with all members for the 
agreement to move forward. Second, it could seek the inclusion 
of similar language to Korea’s FTAs with the U.S. and EU in the 
TPP as a whole to allow for further discussion of this issue to 
determine under what criteria inclusion would be appropriate. 
As part of that discussion there could be a provision that once 
criteria is met there would be discussion on harmonizing 
provisions related to outward processing zone access across 
TPP members.
Foreign Policy Considerations 
Free trade agreements also have political dimensions. In 
recent years, competition between China and the United 
States has increased in the region with each promoting their 
own respective regional agreement. In essence, Korea does 
not want to send the wrong signal to either its largest trading 
partner or most important security partner.
In recent years, China has expressed skepticism regarding 
the TPP and this is somewhat understandable. While the idea 
put forward by some that TPP was an effort to economically 
contain China was always overstated, China does stand to incur 
income losses from the TPP, which Petri and Plummer estimate 
to be $46.8 billion. However, these would more than be made 
up for from a successful RCEP, which could bring China 
income gains of $249.7 billion, or more importantly an FTAAP 
in which China would gain the most by far at $678.1 billion.
Perhaps this, along with the appeal TPP may hold as a vehicle 
for domestic reforms in China, much as its WTO entry was, 
help to explain why China under Xi Jinping has begun to 
show signs that its thinking regarding TPP may be changing. 
Domestic Constraints
While late to join in the proliferation of FTAs, Korea 
has had one of the more robust FTA policies. However, 
in spite of Korea’s dependence on trade there has been 
significant domestic opposition from interest groups such 
as farmers and at times the Democratic Party. As Korea 
considers whether to join the TPP talks these will need to 
be considered as well.
After experiencing harm from liberalizations under the 
Uruguay Round, domestic opposition from farmers to 
Korea’s FTA with Chile delayed its passage until 2004. 
Since the passage of the Chile FTA, farmers in Korea have 
opposed the KORUS FTA and expressed opposition to the 
ongoing negotiations with China. As result, the National 
Assembly passed compensation packages, the FTA Special 
Law, for farmers damaged by trade.
Under Korea’s initial FTA Special Law passed after the 
Chile FTA, farmers would receive income support if prices 
fell below 80 percent of the base price and an indemnity for 
closing fruit orchards that competed with certain products 
imported from Chile from 2004-2008. However, the impact 
from the Chile FTA was less than expected, reducing the 
need for income support. Because the initial FTA Special 
Law had a high bar for income support, farmers received 
little income support. However, as the EU and KORUS 
FTAs came into effect the threshold for receiving income 
support has been raised from 80 percent of a base price to 90 
percent, for which the government has set aside almost $21 
billion through 2017.
Opposition has also come from the Democratic Party, 
the successor party to the Uri Party which negotiated the 
KORUS FTA during the Roh administration. Once in 
opposition, the then Democratic United Party, sought to 
renegotiate certain provisions, such as those related to 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement, partially in response 
to the United States seeking additional negotiations on 
automotives. However, once those negotiations were settled 
with adjustments on both sides, the Democratic United Party 
threatened to withdraw Korea from the agreement should 
they win the 2012 National Assembly elections if their 
demands were not met before implementation. While the 
Saenuri Party won the 2012 elections, the ruling party holds 
only a slim majority in the current National Assembly.
Lastly, relations with Japan will also be a consideration. 
Korea has a trade deficit with Japan and relations between 
the two countries have deteriorated since rows over history, 
Dokdo, comfort women, and the collapse of an intelligence 
sharing agreement in 2012. Polling by the Asan Institute for 
Policy Studies from September 2013 indicates that Korean 
views of Japan have fallen to on par with North Korea, 
while 80 percent of Koreans view relations between the two 
countries as being poor. However, the same polling also 
indicates that Korean views of intelligence sharing with 
Japan have significantly improved since the agreement’s 
initial failure, with 60.4 percent of Koreans supporting 
the agreement. While domestic views of Japan will be a 
consideration in moving forward, the shift on intelligence 
sharing may indicate that significant policy steps with Japan 
are possible, though they may come with a political cost.
Concluding Thoughts
In some ways there are two Korea’s in the debate over 
whether to join TPP. The old Korea, which was a successful 
manufacturing powerhouse that would benefit from a higher 
quality FTA with ASEAN and its RCEP partners, and the new 
Korea that will increasingly rely on services and innovation 
for the creation of jobs and economic growth. Pursuing the 
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TPP should not preclude Korea from also taking part in RCEP, 
and would enhance key aspects of the current administration’s 
trade policy, including efforts to make Korea the linchpin of 
regional economic integration, improve the access of SMEs 
to international trade, and integrate trade policy into efforts to 
make Korea into a creative economy. While achieving these 
goals would best be served through Korea’s entry into the TPP 
before negotiations were concluded, the question for Korea is 
not so much if it will join the TPP, but when.
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